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J. DRAKE 
	 It is an intriguing time to be thinking about the factivity of  reasons. As factive views of  
reasons are gaining favor in epistemology, practical philosophy has been increasingly considering 
the possibility of  nonfactive views. This paper is part of  a larger project that encourages more 
exchange between theorists of  practical and epistemic reasons. Such an exchange would be 
especially fruitful, I think, vis-á-vis the issue of  factivity. The primary aim of  this paper will be to 
slow the factive turn in epistemology, as it were, by appealing to points about the factivity of  
practical reasons. I suspect that the implication of  the main argument of  this paper will strike 
many as surprising; it shows that, in order to successfully establish the view that normative 
epistemic reasons are facts, one must discredit the view that motivating practical reasons need not 
be facts. 
	 The course of  the paper is as follows. I begin in the first section with some preliminary 
remarks about two standard distinctions in the theory of  reasons: that between motivating and 
normative reasons, and that between practical and epistemic reasons. I also briefly spell out what 
the Factive and Nonfactive View of  each of  these looks like. I proceed in the second section of  
the paper to lay out an important claim on which my argument relies: the claim that our 
positions on the factivity of  epistemic and practical normative reasons should agree. I defend this 
claim of  uniformity from an initial concern, namely, that epistemic reasons owe their distinctive 
character precisely to their relation to the truth. That being the case, one might think that we 
have a special reason to think that epistemic reasons are facts –– one which does not also lend 
support to the idea that practical reasons are facts. But I show that this concern is misguided. 
	  An earlier version of  this paper was presented at the Factive Turn in Epistemology Workshop in Vienna, 1
and it has benefited from my interactions with those who attended –– especially Tim Williamson. I owe thanks to 
Veli Mitova and an anonymous referee for helpful feedback on a draft of  the paper; and also to Maria Alvarez and 
Juan Comesaña for discussion of  earlier materials. I am above all indebted to Dan Bonevac, David Sosa, and 
Jonathan Dancy for discussing these ideas with me as I developed them and transitioned through several drafts of  the 
paper. 
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	 With this claim of  uniformity on board, I spend the next three sections of  the paper 
establishing the following claim: if  motivating reasons need not be facts, then normative reasons 
need not be facts. Focusing my attention on practical reasons, I begin in the third section by 
explaining why one might think that motivating reasons need not be facts. I then move in the 
fourth section to motivate the thought that in some cases where A Φs for the reason that r and it 
is not the case that r, A’s Φing is rational; not only can an agent act in the light of  a falsehood, 
but an agent can also act rationally in the light of  a falsehood. I also claim that a plausible 
conception of  rationality is one on which A’s Φing can be rational only if  A’s Φing is done for 
some good reason. If  this is all correct, then some false reasons for which agents act must also be 
good reasons –– and so some normative reasons must not be facts. 
	 I connect all of  the dots in the fifth section by briefly laying out my main argument 
against the factive turn in epistemology. In conjunction with the claim of  uniformity from the 
second section, the previous three sections give us what we need to mount a somewhat surprising 
argument against factive views of  epistemic normative reasons. In the sixth section I address 
three objections. I first address the common argument that motivating reasons cannot be 
falsehoods due to the role they play in explaining actions. I then treat two further objections that 
try to thread the needle a bit, by forcing a wedge between rationality and reasons-responsiveness. 
According to the first of  these, since in the cases of  interest A has no good reason to Φ, we must 
stop short of  attributing rationality to A’s Φing. According to the second of  these, we might 
concede that in these cases A’s Φing is rational, but not in any sense that implies that A Φs for a 
good reason. I conclude in the seventh section by expressing some hesitation about where my 
arguments are leading. One might grant the core argument of  my paper –– that the factivity of  
motivating and normative reasons rise and fall together –– and simply use it as a reductio against 
the view that practical motivating reasons need not be facts. I suggest that this is not as easily 
done as one might initially suppose. 
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I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
	 As I said, I am primarily concerned to establish the claim that: if  motivating reasons need 
not be facts, then normative reasons need not be facts. I have also said that my demonstration of  
this claim will operate primarily on “practical” reasons, but with clear implications for 
“epistemic” reasons. Such a project calls for clarifications on three fronts. 
	 First, there is the standard distinction between motivating and normative reasons.  2
Borrowing from the literature, we can say that a motivating reason is a consideration in the 
light of  which an agent acts. For example, suppose you see me running through the halls. You 
might ask me why I am running through the halls. I would likely respond by presenting the 
consideration(s) which motivated me to run through the halls (for example, the consideration that 
I am late to give my eleven o’clock lecture). You would likely be satisfied with such a response, as 
it would help you to make sense of  my action. But you might also be interested in whether there 
is, as we might say, any good reason for me to be running through the halls. Here you are looking 
for what is called a normative reason: a consideration that counts in favor of  a response. In 
normal cases (such as the one considered here), the agent’s motivating reason will be a normative 
reason. In telling you that I am late to give my lecture, I have presented you with that 
consideration which casts my action in a favorable light; I have told you not only why I am 
running, but also, perhaps, why I should be running. 
	 Recently, there has been debate concerning the “factivity” of  both kinds of  reasons. In 
practical philosophy and action theory, there has been much more debate about the factivity of  
motivating reasons. In that debate, there are two main views. One is the 
Factive ViewM: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, it must be the case that r. 
	  
	  Too many to name employ this common distinction, which is perhaps owed to Michael Smith [1992: 2
329]. For relevant introductions to the distinction, though, see Jonathan Dancy [2000: 1ff] for something brief, and 
Maria Alvarez [2010] for something more thorough. Cases like the ones I will discuss might impress upon us the idea 
that we need a third class: explanatory reasons. Alvarez [2010; 2016] has done well to argue for this position, but I 
cannot treat it here.
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The competitor to this view is the Nonfactive ViewM, which is just the denial of  the Factive 
ViewM.  According to the Factive ViewM, I cannot be running through the halls for the reason that I 3
am late unless I really am late. The Nonfactive ViewM denies this, and holds that my reason for 
running might be that I am late even if  I am not really late. The debate about such claims is 
distinct from the debate about the factivity of  normative reasons, which has received more 
attention in recent epistemology. In that debate, there are also two main views. One is the 
Factive ViewN: in order for r to be a reason for A to Φ, it must be the case that r. 
The competitor to this view is the Nonfactive ViewN, which is just the denial of  the Factive 
ViewN.  Of  course, in this context, the phrase “be a reason for A to Φ” should be taken not 4
motivationally, but rather as, roughly, “count in favor of  A’s Φing”. So, independent of  what my 
(motivating) reason is for running through the halls, proponents of  the Factive ViewN will hold 
that my being late can only count in favor of  my running if  I really am late. Those who endorse 
the Nonfactive ViewN will deny this claim, holding that my being late might count in favor of  my 
running regardless of  whether I really am late. 
	 These clarifying remarks have so far involved an example of  so-called “practical” reasons; 
but, as I have noted, these issues manifest vis-á-vis so-called “epistemic" reasons as well. This is 
	  I have modified the labels here from Dancy [2011], who has argued [2000; 2003; 2011; 2014] for the 3
Nonfactive ViewM extensively. Juan Comesaña and Matthew McGrath [2014], as well as Mark Schroeder [2008], 
defend a nonfactive view of  having reasons; but the connection to acting for a reason is not completely clear. 
Constantine Sandis [2013] claims to endorse the view; but since he denies that false motivating reasons have 
explanatory power, it is not clear that his position should be grouped with Dancy’s. In epistemology, David Enoch 
[2010: 984] seems to express sympathy for the view in passing. 
	 The Factive ViewM is far and away the dominant view in the literature on practical reasons. A relevant 
sample includes Alvarez [2010], Donald Davidson [1980], Jennifer Hornsby [2008], John Hyman [2011], and John 
McDowell [2013]. In epistemology, Timothy Williamson [2000; 2014] falls in the Factivist camp; and Clayton 
Littlejohn [2012: 149ff] also seems sympathetic to a kind Factive View.
	  In the literature on practical and moral reasons, the Factive ViewN is so far in the majority that it is often 4
assumed without argument. Indeed, the assumption is often that reasons for acting are facts, and the debate is about 
what kind of  facts they might be. See Parfit [2011: 31] for an example. 
	 In the literature on epistemic reasons, things are a bit different; and the debate about the factivity of  
epistemic normative reasons might be hiding under the label “the factivity of  evidence.” On that topic, the Factive 
ViewN of  epistemic reasons is only recently coming in to some favor, with the work of  those like Williamson [2000] 
and Littlejohn [2012; 2013a; 2013b]. See Thomas Kelly [2008] for a nice discussion on how this debate has 
developed.
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the third and final front on which my project is in need of  clarification. Borrowing from the 
literature is less useful in making this distinction, but I shall try to follow roughly the distinction as 
laid out by Joseph Raz.  The distinction between practical and epistemic reasons is most easily 5
thought of  as a distinction between two kinds of  normative reasons. According to this 
framework, practical reasons are considerations that owe their normative force to their relation to 
values. Epistemic reasons, on the other hand, are considerations that owe their normative force to 
their relation to the truth. For example, my being late to give my eleven o’clock lecture seems to 
be a practical reason: it favors my running through the halls, and it so favors in virtue of  its 
relation to certain values (such as that of  being punctual). As such, this is a practical reason; but 
there are epistemic reasons nearby. Suppose that you ask me why I believe that I am late, and I 
respond that the clock in my office reads quarter-past eleven. As such, this fact about my clock 
seems to be an epistemic reason: it favors my believing that I am late, and it so favors in virtue of  
its relation to the truth (about what time it is). 
II. UNIFORMITY 
	 So much for preliminaries. I said at the outset that this paper is a part of  a larger project 
that encourages more exchange between theories of  practical and epistemic reasons. But, given 
the deep difference in the respective natures of  practical and epistemic reasons, one might worry 
about the prospective fruitfulness of  such an exchange. If  there is legitimate reason to worry, the 
main argument of  this paper might be robbed of  some of  its force. That is because the argument 
relies in part on the claim that I will call 
Uniformity: ceteris paribus, the best theory of  reasons will hold just one position about the 
factivity of  reasons, which is true of  every kind of  reason. 
	  See Raz [2011: 36-58] for a particularly nice explication of  this distinction, which I take to be standard. 5
Notice that this crucial distinction remains intact even on views according to which truth is a kind of  value (and 
epistemic reasons can therefore be thought of  as a kind of  practical reason). The distinction would then be grounded 
in a distinction between two kinds of  values. Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to address this 
possibility.
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I mean this claim to apply within each of  the realms of  motivating and normative reasons 
independently, but across normative realms (moral, epistemic, practical, aesthetic, or otherwise) 
therein. Suppose, for example, that we become convinced that the Factive ViewN of  epistemic 
reasons is correct. Then, according to the principle of  uniformity, there is theoretical pressure to 
endorse the Factive ViewN of  practical reasons. Similarly: if  one becomes convinced that the 
Nonfactive ViewM of  practical reasons is correct, then one is under some theoretical pressure to 
endorse the Nonfactive ViewM of  epistemic reasons. For my part, I find this commitment to 
uniformity to be simply intuitive. I also know of  no good argument against it; and so I will treat it 
as a kind of  working assumption. 
	 Plausible though the principle of  uniformity may be, one may have doubts about it 
because of  the difference between practical and epistemic reasons just laid out. The 
distinguishing mark of  epistemic reasons is supposed to be their relation to the truth (practical 
reasons stand in no such special relation); and the debate about the factivity of  reasons is, 
essentially, a debate about whether something must be true in order to be a reason. Should we 
not, then, expect a deep difference between practical and epistemic reasons on the issue of  
factivity? I think not. There are two questions that need to be separated here. One is the question 
of  what makes something a reason at all; another question is what makes something a reason of  a 
particular kind. The distinction just laid out, of  course, gives a standard answer to the second 
question. But that answer does not imply any answer to the first question. Suppose that r is an 
epistemic reason for some agent A to Φ (where Φing is, say, believing that p). The standard 
distinction tells us that what makes r an epistemic reason to Φ, rather than a practical reason to 
Φ, is the relation that r bears to the truth of  p (for example, r might make it more likely to be true 
that p). This, of  course, says nothing about whether r itself is true; it is not the truth of  r, but 
rather the effect that r has on the truth of  p, that is important for making the standard distinction. 
But the debate over the factivity of  reasons, applied here, would be a debate about whether r itself 
must be true in order to be a reason. So we can see clearly that the special relation that epistemic 
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reasons bear to the truth is really no reason at all to suspect that they will be deeply different from 
practical reasons vis-á-vis the issue of  factivity. 
	 If  the principle of  uniformity is correct, there may be serious implications for theorizing 
about reasons –– especially if  the natures of  motivating and normative reasons can be connected 
in the manner I shall go on to claim in this paper. Together, these two claims amount to the 
thought that theories of  reasons must take just one position on factivity, which holds for all kinds 
of  reasons: motivating, normative, practical, and epistemic. Consequently, someone who sets out 
to establish the factivity of  normative epistemic reasons, for example, will be saddled with 
defending the factivity of  these other varieties of  reasons as well. 
III. ACTING IN THE LIGHT OF A FALSEHOOD 
	 With these initial remarks in mind, I move in this section toward my main claim that if  
motivating reasons need not be facts, then normative reasons need not be facts (or, in other 
words, if  the Nonfactive ViewM is correct, then the Nonfactive ViewN is also correct). In this 
section I will explain why one might think that motivating reasons need not be facts –– or 
(alternatively), that in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, it need not be the case that r. To help 
with this, I will employ variations of  a case that has become somewhat standard in the literature 
on the factivity of  practical motivating reasons.  6
SKATING: Imagine a pond that has thin ice in the middle. Edna takes it that the ice in the middle 
of  the pond is thin. So, when she skates, Edna keeps to the edge of  the pond. You are on a nearby 
hill, and you see Edna skating. You ask her why she is skating as she is, and she tells you that the 
ice in the middle of  the pond is thin. 
I take it to be rather natural and uncontroversial to understand this case such that Edna’s reason 
for skating near the edge of  the pond is that [THIN ICE]: the ice in the middle of  the pond is thin. 
	  I am adapting this example from Hornsby [2008: 251], which, as far as I know, traces back to Gilbert Ryle 6
[1949: 117-118] –– although its more contemporary usage may be due to Peter Unger [1975: 209-211].
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When I say that I take it to be natural and uncontroversial, I am speaking pre-theoretically: there 
is, pre-theoretically, no reason to deny this understanding of  the case (or to privilege another 
understanding over it). At the very least, we can say that in skating near the edge of  the pond, 
Edna is responding to the consideration that [THIN ICE]. 
	 But independent theoretical reason for taking the case in this way can be provided. In 
SKATING, you are observing Edna’s behavior with no view about how things are with the ice. You 
ask Edna why she is skating near the edge of  the pond. Insofar as, when we ask such questions, we 
take ourselves to be asking for what reason the agent in question is so acting, we express some 
sympathy for the claim that 
motivating reasons play an explanatory role: if  A Φs for the reason that r, then r can 
play an explanatory role with respect to A’s Φing.  7
When we ask this sort of  “Why?” question, I think we are looking for a particular kind of  
explanation of  the action. We are looking for an explanation that will make the action rationally 
intelligible. When Edna responds to our inquiry with some appeal to or presentation of  the 
consideration that [THIN ICE], our inquiry has been satisfied. Edna has given the kind of  
response that puts her skating in a rationally intelligible light. 
	 Now consider a slightly different case. 
TWO SKATERS: Imagine two adjacent ponds. Edna takes it that the ice in the middle of  one pond 
is thin. So, when she skates on it, she keeps to the edge of  the pond. Edmund takes it that the ice 
in the middle of  the other pond is thin. So, when he skates on it, he keeps to the edge of  the 
pond. You are on a nearby hill, and you see both skaters skating –– but you have no view about 
	  Sandis [2013: 30] rightly refers to this claim as a common “assumption” in the literature; resultantly, it is 7
rarely explicitly stated or endorsed (although one can find hints of  it in those like Alvarez [2011: 41n9] saying that 
“because” is factive). Kieran Setiya [2007: 39-47] provides a nice defense of  the axiom if  one is needed, even going 
so far as to argue that taking something to be a motivating reason just is taking it to be explanatory. Contemporary 
roots of  this axiom are perhaps found in G. E. M. Anscombe [1957: 9ff].
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how things are with the ice. As they finish, you ask them both why they keep to the edge while 
they skate. They both tell you that the ice in the middle of  the pond is thin. When you get home, 
your sister tells you that the ice in the middle of  Edmund’s pond is just fine. 
Now, as with SKATING, I think that the natural way to understand this case is such that both 
Edna and Edmund act for the reason that [THIN ICE]. In TWO SKATERS, I think you would 
accept both responses to your “Why?” question without a fuss. Both Edna and Edmund have 
presented you with their reason for acting, which you can use to make sense of  their actions. 
Furthermore, the information your sister gives you when you get home makes no difference to 
this. What your sister tells you about Edmund’s pond does not leave you confused as to what 
Edmund was doing or why he was doing it. Despite the fact that Edmund was wrong about the 
way the world is, you can still understand his behavior by the thought that “His reason for 
keeping to the edge was that the ice in the middle of  the pond is thin.” 
	 I am well aware that what I have just said is controversial (though in my view it should not 
be), and I will treat a serious objection to this analysis in the sixth section of  the paper. Right now 
I want to treat an initial but ultimately superficial worry about what I have just said. Someone 
resisting my analysis might say: “I would not accept Edmund’s answer to my ‘Why?’ question, 
since I do not accept that [THIN ICE].” My initial response to this worry is a simple reminder that 
in the case, you have no view about how things are with the ice at first. So I think you would 
accept his answer. Now, one might think, “But when I get home to my sister, I will realize that I 
should not accept his answer –– since surely at that point I do not accept that [THIN ICE].” One 
might think this; but it would be puzzling. Of  course, the information your sister gives you should 
lead you to reject Edmund’s utterance “that [THIN ICE]” as an assertion. But what you learn from 
your sister should not prevent you from taking Edmund’s answer as a statement of  his reason, 
anymore than it should prevent you from receiving his answer as a statement of  something he 
takes to be the case. Evidence for this is that, as I pointed out in the last paragraph, the 
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information from your sister does not leave you reeling, in search of  a (new) explanation of  
Edmund’s action. 
	 It is not important to settle what exactly to say about Edmund at this juncture. For now, 
one need only realize that it is not so unintuitive, pre-theoretically, to take Edmund’s reason to be 
that [THIN ICE] even though it is not the case that [THIN ICE]. Indeed, I think that these previous 
considerations might suggest that the Nonfactive ViewM is more intuitive than the Factive ViewM. 
But it is enough for now to acknowledge that it seems possible, as I will say, to act in the light of  a 
falsehood. 
IV. ACTING RATIONALLY IN THE LIGHT OF A FALSEHOOD 
	 As theorists, though, we might be interested not only in what agents’ reasons for acting 
are or could be. We might also be interested in whether, when an agent acts for some reason or 
another, the agent is acting rationally in so doing. We might allow that, for example, Edmund acts 
for the reason that [THIN ICE] even though it is not the case that [THIN ICE]. But when he so acts, 
is his action rational? 
	 To get at this question, consider a second pair of  cases. 
JUST SKATING: Imagine that Edmund is about to go skating. As he heads out, Edna tells him that 
the ice in the middle of  the pond is thin. When Edmund goes out to the pond, the ice in the 
middle of  the pond looks thin to him. Edmund takes it that the ice in the middle of  the pond is 
thin. So, when he skates, Edmund keeps to the edge of  the pond. Meanwhile, you are on a nearby 
hill, and you see Edmund skating. You approach him and ask him why he is skating as he is. He 
responds by saying that the ice in the middle of  the pond is thin. 
There is nothing unusual about this case. This is the kind of  situation that any of  us living near a 
pond might find ourselves in on a nice winter day. I think that any of  us in this case would accept 
Edmund’s response to our inquiry. If  it occurred to us to ask the question at all (which, quite 
tellingly, I think, it would not), we would deem Edmund’s action to be rational. I also think we 
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would be right on both counts: Edmund does act for the reason that [THIN ICE], and Edmund’s 
skating near the edge, in light of  the consideration that [THIN ICE], is rational. Suppose though, 
that I add one detail to the case: 
SKATING IN IGNORANCE: Imagine that Edmund is about to go skating. As he heads out, Edna 
tells him that the ice in the middle of  the pond is thin. When Edmund goes out to the pond, the 
ice in the middle of  the pond looks thin to him. Edmund takes it that the ice in the middle of  the 
pond is thin. So, when he skates, Edmund keeps to the edge of  the pond. Meanwhile, you are on 
a nearby hill, and you see Edmund skating. You approach him and ask him why he is skating as 
he is. He responds by telling you that the ice in the middle of  the pond is thin. Unbeknownst to 
Edna, Edmund, and you, the ice in the middle of  the pond is not thin. 
Now, it seems to me that this second pair of  cases is dialectically analogous to the first pair of  
cases, in the following way. We have the intuition about JUST SKATING that Edmund’s skating is 
rational. Just as with the transition from SKATING to TWO SKATERS, adding the last detail here 
does nothing to alter our initial judgment. In moving from JUST SKATING to SKATING IN 
IGNORANCE, Edmund goes from having a true belief  about the pond to having a false belief; but 
so far as the rationality of  his action is concerned, nothing has changed. 
	 Some may be tempted to deny what I have just said. That is, some will want to uphold the 
(intuitive) claim that Edmund’s action is rational in JUST SKATING, but deny it in SKATING IN 
IGNORANCE. But doing this requires not just denying the intuitive verdict in such cases, but also 
denying plausible general claim about rationality. This is the claim that 
error need not create irrationality: in some cases, the difference between A’s being right 
about some bare empirical fact p and A’s being wrong about p is not the kind of  difference 
that can, on its own, make a difference to whether A is Φing rationally.  8
	  Thanks to an anonymous referee here, whose comments helped me to formulate the claim in this way.8
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There are some facts such that an agent’s being wrong about them pretty clearly does impugn 
that agent’s rationality. If  Edmund thought that there being five clouds in the sky was reason to 
keep to the edge of  the pond, for example, and this was the only consideration that he could 
mention in giving an account of  his skating, we might have our doubts about the rationality of  
his action. But Edmund’s being wrong about whether [THIN ICE] does not seem to fit this bill –– 
especially in cases like SKATING IN IGNORANCE, where Edmund seemingly has good reason to 
believe that [THIN ICE]. 
	 In the light of  these considerations, I think that the plausible thing to say is that Edmund’s 
skating near the edge is rational –– even in SKATING IN IGNORANCE. It is possible, as I have said, 
to act rationally in the light of  a falsehood. But what does this have to do with the factivity of  
normative reasons? To make the connection, consider one final case: 
SENSELESS SKATING: Imagine that Edmund is about to go skating. As he heads out, Edna tells 
him that the weather is nice, and that it is a great day for skating. When Edmund goes out to the 
pond, he does not notice anything strange about the ice. So, when he skates, Edmund keeps to the 
edge of  the pond. Meanwhile, you are on a nearby hill, and you see Edmund skating. You 
approach him and ask why he is skating as he is. He responds by telling you that the weather is 
nice, that it is a great day for skating, and that he noticed nothing strange about the ice. 
Now, I think that any of  us in this case would have our doubts as to the rationality of  Edmund’s 
action. Indeed, we may find it difficult to even make his action intelligible. I think that the most 
plausible explanation of  these reactions is that we cannot find, anywhere in Edmund’s account of  
his action, any good reason for doing what he is doing. This makes it hard to suppose that his 
action is rational; for an action to be rational, it is natural to think, it must be done for some good 
reason. Even independent of  our judgments about cases like SENSELESS SKATING, this claim 
follows from a plausible (even if  naive) conception of  rationality itself. We naturally conceive of  
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rationality as some kind of  appropriate reasons-responsiveness.  If  acting rationally 9
is, inter alia, responding appropriately to reasons, then an action must at least be an appropriate 
response to some consideration in order to be rational. But unlike his action in JUST SKATING 
and SKATING IN IGNORANCE, Edmund’s action in SENSELESS SKATING shows no signs of  this 
appropriate responsiveness. 
V. MOTIVATING REASON TO SLOW THE FACTIVE TURN 
	 We now have in place the materials for my master argument against the Factive ViewN of  
epistemic reasons. The argument goes as follows. 
[1] In some cases where A Φs for the reason that r, it is not the case that r. 
[2] In some cases as described in [1], A’s Φing is rational. 
[3] A’s Φing can be rational only if  A Φs for a good reason. 
[4] In such cases as described in [2], r must be a good reason for Φing. 
[5] Some good reasons for Φing are things that are not the case. 
[6] If  the Nonfactive ViewN is true of  practical reasons, then it is true of  epistemic reasons. 
[C] Some epistemic normative reasons are things that are not the case. 
Premise [1] was provided by the intuitive claim that Edna and Edmund act for the same reason 
in TWO SKATERS. Premise [2] was provided by analogous judgments about Edmund in JUST 
SKATING and SKATING IN IGNORANCE, as well as the plausible principle that error need not 
create irrationality. Premise [3] was provided by a plausible explanation of  our confusion about 
Edmund’s action in SENSELESS SKATING, as well as the plausible analysis of  rationality as some 
kind of  appropriate reasons-responsiveness. Claim [4] follows from premises [1]-[3], on the 
simplifying assumption that, for example, [THIN ICE] is the only consideration Edmund is 
	  See Comesaña and McGrath [2014] for an example of  a specification of  this conception. There are some 9
who, like Niko Kolodny, try to distinguish between rationality and reasons-responsiveness. I address an objection 
based on such a distinction in the sixth section. Thanks to Veli Mitova for pointing out the relevance of  such views.
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responding to in IGNORANT SKATING. Claim [5] follows from claim [4]. Premise [6] is an 
application of  the principle of  uniformity argued for in section two. The conclusion, [C], follows 
from claims [5] and [6]: epistemic reasons for belief  –– or evidence, if  you like  –– need not be 10
facts. 
	 The philosophical value of  this argument, I hope you will agree, is not limited to its being 
a challenge to the Factive ViewN of  epistemic reasons. As I said at the outset, it also demonstrates 
an important connection that some may find surprising: in order for one to defend the Factive 
ViewN of  epistemic reasons, one must also defend the Factive ViewM of  practical reasons. 
VI. CAN THE FACTIVE TURN BE FORCED? 
	 I now want to briefly address three serious objections to this argument. My argument 
starts, in premise [1], with the thought that A can Φ for the reason that r even if  it is not the case 
that r. But there has recently come a strong challenge to this claim in the literature on practical 
motivation. According to this challenge, the Nonfactive ViewM is at odds with the axiomatic 
claim that explanation is factive. The argument goes something like this:  11
[O1] All motivating reasons are explanatory. 
[O2] All things that are explanatory are facts. 
[O3] Therefore, all motivating reasons are facts. 
The first premise here is recognizable from earlier. Any time A Φs for the reason that r, r can play 
an explanatory role vis-á-vis A’s Φing; there is a certain sense of  the question “Why?” that will 
only be satisfied by appeal to the agent’s motivating reason. The second premise is the axiomatic 
	  Here I follow Kelly [2009] in assuming that evidence is something like good epistemic reason to believe. A few 10
have tried to challenge this conception, but as Kelly [2009: 5] notes, most assume that “‘reason to believe’ and 
‘evidence’ are more or less synonymous.”
	  This seems to be the main argument responsible for garnering the Factive ViewM of  practical reasons the 11
support it currently enjoys. For a relevant sample of  the discussion around this argument, see Alvarez [2010], Dancy 
[2011; 2014], Hornsby [2008], Hyman [2011], James Lenman [2011], McDowell [2013], and Sandis [2013].
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claim that explanation is factive. Together, these two claims are supposed to show that the 
Nonfactive ViewM cannot be right; so my master argument has an implausible first premise. 
	 This argument from the factivity of  explanation deserves much more careful attention 
than it has so far received –– careful attention that I cannot give it here. Instead, I want to cut 
right to the core of  the argument, showing why I think it will ultimately fail as an objection to the 
Nonfactive ViewM. If  this argument is sound, then the Nonfactive ViewM cannot give good 
reasons-explanations of  actions done by agents like Edmund. That is: according to this argument, 
if  it is not the case that r, r is not capable of  playing an explanatory role vis-á-vis any agent’s 
Φing. But it seems quite clear to me that this is not so. In the third section, we observed that in 
the case of  TWO SKATERS, we could explain Edmund’s skating by appeal to his reason –– despite 
his reason being a falsehood. 
	 I now press a bit more on this issue. To see that this argument is faulty, all we need is an 
example of  a satisfying reasons-explanation that makes use of  a false reason. To that end, I think 
we can answer the question “Why is Edmund skating near the edge?” by saying that 
His reason is that [THIN ICE]. 
This answer seems to me to be at least equal in explanatory power to the response that 
He believes that [THIN ICE]. 
Both of  these answers to the relevant “Why?” question seem perfectly natural and satisfying 
(though perhaps importantly different). Furthermore, the consideration that [THIN ICE] is 
indispensable to both of  these explanations of  Edmund’s action. But neither of  these answers 
implies or requires –– in their own right, or as explanatory claims –– that it is the case that [THIN 
ICE]. If  the first explanation really is successful, it seems to follow that we can explain Edmund’s 
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action by appeal to his reason for acting, even though his reason is a falsehood. But if  that is 
right, then the objection in question must be flawed.  12
	 This first objection only challenges the Nonfactive ViewM of  practical reasons. Recall, 
though, that my central purpose is to show that the Nonfactive ViewM of  practical reasons and 
the Factive ViewN of  epistemic reasons are at odds. The next two objections, if  successful, might 
provide a way to sever the connection here, and so resolve any potential tension. The first of  
these is an argument against premise [2]. According to this objection, although there might be 
something praiseworthy about what Edmund is doing, we should stop short of  saying that his 
action is rational. In order for his action to be rational, it must be a response to some good reason 
for acting. But in cases like TWO SKATERS, for example, there are no good reasons for Edmund to 
do what he is doing. We know this because there is no feature of  the world that favors his doing 
what he is doing. There is a feature that Edmund might think favors his skating near the edge, but 
alas, that feature is not a real feature of  the situation. Since rationality consists in some 
appropriate reasons-responsiveness, we must stop short of  saying that his action is rational. 
	 I will address the second half  of  the objection below. I want now to address only the 
suggestion that we can stop short of  saying that Edmund’s action is rational. I have two things to 
say in response to this suggestion. The first is that, while Edmund’s action may be ill-informed, it 
seems to be very difficult to say that it is irrational –– that it is rationally impermissible. Aside from 
the plain intuitive judgment that this is so, the principle that error need not create irrationality 
supports this claim. So if  we must say either that his action is rationally permissible or that it is 
rationally impermissible, we should surely say the former. My second response is to ask those 
hesitant to ascribe rationality to Edmund’s action to consider what terms of  appraisal they might 
find applicable in its stead. We might naturally say, for example, that his action is reasonable; that 
	  A completely satisfying rebuttal of  the argument would include an account of  the flaw in the argument. I 12
do not have the space to fully treat this issue here, since a full treatment, I think, would require a robust theory of  
explanation. But allow me to briefly sketch what I take the problem to be. The complication is that the notion of  
being explanatory is ambiguous. If  being explanatory just means being the explanation, for example, the argument may be 
difficult for the Nonfactivist to maneuver around. But this seems to me not a very promising analysis. Being 
explanatory might also mean, for example, contributing to an explanation. On this understanding of  the notion, the 
Nonfactivist can make use of  the kind of  maneuver I have just laid out.
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his action is perfectly sensible; his action is easily intelligible; his action is understandable; it is what any 
rational agent in his position would do; and so on. Indeed, I think that we can say all of  these things 
without hesitation –– and we would be correct in saying them. But with this cluster of  concepts 
before me I now feel puzzled about the initial hesitation: it would be a fairly foreign, and perhaps 
somewhat artificial notion of  rationality such that all of  these things can truly be said of  
Edmund’s action, and yet we cannot truly describe his action as rational. So I would invite 
anyone making this objection to provide and motivate that further conception of  rationality.  13
	 I will address a third and final objection before concluding. A third line of  resistance is to 
concede premise [2], but not in any sense that implies that Edmund had good reason to do what 
he did. For example, we may be able to pinpoint considerations or features that allow us to give a 
rationalizing explanation of  Edmund’s action, or perhaps pick out some rational requirement that he 
satisfies. But these things do not strictly imply that there is any good reason for Edmund to be 
skating near the edge of  the pond. So we can admit that Edmund’s action is in some sense rational 
while resisting premise [3]. 
	 I have only one thing to say in response to this objection, which seems to me a hard point 
to maneuver around. It is, in many ways, the thought that makes the central argument of  this 
paper compelling (if  indeed it is compelling). The thought is this: if  we grant that Edmund is 
acting for the reason that [THIN ICE], and that he is responding appropriately to that consideration, 
it requires a great deal of  subtlety to proceed to say that he has no good reason for doing what he 
is. It seems to me undeniable that Edmund is responding to the consideration that the ice in the 
middle of  the pond is thin. That is more or less a stipulation of  the case. It also seems undeniable 
that Edmund is responding appropriately to this consideration. The appropriate thing to do, in 
the light of  the consideration that [THIN ICE], is avoid the middle of  the pond. We can ask the 
question: What makes this response appropriate? The very natural thought is that the 
consideration in question counts in favor of  the response in question. I suppose, in a way, I can 
	  I do not want to create the impression that this is an impossible task. Littlejohn [2017], for example, has 13
tried his hand at teasing some of  these notions apart (thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this to my 
attention). Adjudicating whether such projects are successful is beyond the scope of  this paper.
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leave a challenge here similar to that which I left to the previous objection. The challenge is to 
provide and motivate accounts of  being the favored response and being the appropriate response such that 
one can cleanly tease these things apart when dealing with characters like Edmund. I am 
skeptical that this can be done. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
	 There is one way out of  my main argument that I have not discussed, and I should like to 
end by commenting on it. It is the piece of  the second objection which I previously set aside for 
later. I know that there are many who have a sort of  bedrock intuition that something that is not 
the case simply cannot favor anything. Some of  those who have this thought may even find it to 
be more intuitive and plausible than each of  the premises of  my argument. Instead of  resisting 
the validity or soundness of  the argument directly, then, one might claim the conclusion of  my 
argument constitutes a reductio of  it; the link that I worked to establish between practical 
motivating reasons and epistemic normative reasons could possibly be used against me in this 
way. I can see two general ways in which this might be tried. The first is that one might treat my 
argument as a kind of  paradox: even though it cannot be said exactly what the flaw is in the 
argument, we know that something must be wrong with it given the conclusion it arrives at. The 
second possibility is that one might think that the implausibility of  the conclusion of  my 
argument should lead us to reject one of  the premises in the argument –– perhaps whichever 
seems to be the weakest link. 
	 Now, I am not sure how substantively I could proceed to debate my opponent who takes 
the first option here; but I also suspect that most will not be satisfied with that option. So I would 
like to close by making a couple of  remarks about the second option. I anticipate that most of  my 
opponents will find the first premise to be the weak link here. So, adopting the reductio strategy, 
one might say that my argument shows not that the Factive ViewN of  epistemic reasons is false, 
but rather that the Nonfactive ViewM of  practical reasons is false. I myself  feel the pull of  the 
thought that something that is not the case cannot favor anything –– though not as strongly as I 
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feel the pull of  the thought that one can act for a reason that is not the case. But in any event, 
both claims on either end of  the argument have some initial pull to them. This is part of  what 
makes this way of  refusing my argument unpersuasive to me. It seems that, in order to take my 
argument as a reductio of  the Nonfactive ViewM, one must, in a way, privilege the favoring role of  
reasons in their ontology. That is, the thought must be something like this: any reason, whatever 
else it is, must be something that is capable of  favoring. But this kind of  favoring-first view of  
reasons is not at all appealing to me. It seems clear to me that the concept of  a reason picks out 
the kind of  thing that should, in principle, be capable of  playing three roles: one motivational, 
one normative, and one explanatory. Of  course, when things go well, one and the same 
consideration can play all three of  these roles. But I see no reason at all to privilege one of  these 
aspects over the others. 
	 I have also began to wonder just how intuitive it is that something that is not the case 
cannot favor anything. I am increasingly tempted to think of  the favoring relation as analogous, 
vis-á-vis factivity, to the logical implication relation. The fact that P entails Q, for example, is not 
sensitive to the truth-value of  P or Q. That is: P can stand in the entailment relation to Q 
regardless of  whether P is true or Q is true.  The claim that “If  it is raining, then it is wet” can 14
be true whether or not it is raining (or wet). It is not unreasonable to imagine that the favoring 
relation might work similarly. Consider the claim “If  it is raining, then I should bring an 
umbrella.” It seems obvious to me that this claim can be true whether or not it is raining. But this 
is just a natural way of  putting a thought about what I have good reason to do. I might as well 
have said, “Its raining favors my bringing an umbrella.” But if  that is so, then one claim can be 
placed in the favoring relation to another independent of  the truth-value of  either claim. 
	 In any event, even one who does try to resist my argument by this kind of  reductio has 
made a concession with which I would be pleased. I said at the outset that I had two main goals 
for this paper. One goal was to establish a surprising connection between the factivity of  practical 
motivating reasons and the factivity of  epistemic normative reasons. A second goal was to use 
	  For those sensitive to such things, this seems to me true also of  probability relations: we can place P and Q 14
in certain probability relations without thinking that either P or Q is true.
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this connection to construct a novel argument against the Factive ViewN of  epistemic reasons. 
The one who adopts this kind of  reductio strategy has at least conceded that I have accomplished 
my first goal. As to the second goal: I hope that the argument of  this paper can do something to 
slow the factive turn in epistemology, even if  it cannot bring it to a full stop.  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